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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Daniel Parsons appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his
post-conviction petition.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Parsons and his wife drove from Nevada to Idaho equipped with wigs,
disguises, a police scanner, and a loaded gun. (R., p. 506.) They checked into
a motel at 1:45 a.m.

(Id.)

Even though he drove his own car from Nevada,

Parsons rented a van in Idaho. (R., pp. 506-507.) Parsons and his wife checked
out of the motel at 1:13 p.m. (R., p. 507.) At 2:30 p.m. Parsons' wife entered a
bank wearing a long wig, gloves and sunglasses and attempted to rob it. (Id.)
She then sprinted from the bank and jumped in a van driven by a man matching
Parsons' description. (Id.) The van sped off. (Id.) Clothes and wigs matching
the clothes and wig worn by Parsons' wife were later recovered from the
Parsons. (Id.)
After the attempted robbery, the Parsons returned to the motel. (Id.) The
next day the Parsons returned the rented van.

(Id.)

The following day they

checked out of the motel and drove their own car to a different bank.

(Id.)

Parsons parked the car behind some apartments near the bank. (Id.) He kept
the car running. (Id.)
Approximately 17 minutes after they left the motel, Parsons' wife, wearing
a wig, sunglasses and concealing clothes entered the bank carrying a plastic
"superman" bag and a loaded gun. (Id.) She handed the teller a note that said
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"WE HAVE GUNS! MONEY IN BAG!" (Id.) The bank teller gave her money with
a tracker inside. (Id.) Parsons' wife quickly left the bank and entered Parsons'
still running car. (Id.)
The police followed the tracker inside the money.

(Id.)

A responding

officer turned on his overhead lights and two cars pulled over, one of which was
Parsons' car.

(Id.) As the officer approached the cars, Parsons immediately

speed off. (Id.) Parsons led the police on a high-speed chase on 1-84, putting
many people at risk. (Id.) Parsons eventually left 1-84 and led the police on a
chase thorough Meridian on two-lane roads, attaining speeds of up to 90 m.p.h.
(Id.)
(Id.)

During the chase, Parsons crossed into on-coming traffic several times.
The police deployed spikes.

(Id.)

Parsons left the roadway at

approximately 100 m.p.h., went through a wooden fence and finally crashed in a
residential yard, just missing a children's swingset. (Id.) Both Parsons and his
wife were injured. (R., pp. 507-508.) After they were apprehended Parsons' wife
immediately admitted to being the robber. (R., pp. 507-508.) She told the police
that Parson did nothing and it was all her. (Id.) In the car the police found a
scanner and a loaded gun with one bullet in the chamber. (R., p. 508.) Parsons'
wife later admitted to the bank robbery and the attempted bank robbery.

(Id.)

She also admitted to several similar bank robberies in prior years. (Id.)
Parsons' wife later told law enforcement that she did not threaten Mr.
Parsons or point the gun at him. (R., pp. 249-252.) She said that when Parsons
drove her to the bank he knew she was going to rob the bank. (R., pp. 251-252.)
She admitted that when he drove her to the bank she was dressed in "character"
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and was already wearing the wig.

(Id.) According to Parsons' wife, Parsons

already knew where to park at the bank when she went in to rob it. (Id.)
The state charged Parsons with Aiding and Abetting Robbery and Eluding
a Peace Officer. (R., p. 506.) A jury found Parsons guilty of both charges. (Id.)
A jury also found Parsons was a persistent violator. (Id.) Parsons has a long,
extensive and violent criminal history. (R., p. 508.) The district court sentenced
Parsons to a fixed life term of imprisonment for aiding and abetting robbery and
a consecutive fixed life term for eluding a peace officer, inclusive of the
persistent violator enhancement. (R., p. 506.)
Parsons appealed, and in a published decision, the Idaho Court of
Appeals affirmed his convictions of aiding and abetting robbery and eluding a
peace officer with a persistent violator enhancement. (R., p. 508 (citing State v.
Parsons, 153 Idaho 666, 289 P.3d 1059 (Ct. App. 2012).)
Parsons filed a Petition and Affidavit For Post-Conviction Relief. (R., pp.
5-395.)

Parsons requested post-conviction counsel.

district court appointed post-conviction counsel.

(R., pp. 396-399.)

The

(R., pp. 411-412.) As part of

Parsons' Post-Conviction Petition he requested that the district judge be
disqualified. (R., pp. 440-444.) The district court denied Parsons' request and
ultimately held:
The Court in this case reviewed his allegations and finds that they
really amount to nothing more than explaining the course of events
involved in his criminal trial. In fact, his allegations are nothing more
than a rehash of the allegations contained in his Petition for postconviction relief. Like the judge in Stedtfeld the Court denies the
Motion in an exercise of discretion and finds it has no knowledge
from any extrajudicial source affecting the Court's opinion on the
merits of Parsons' post-conviction Petition.
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(R., p. 442) (citing Stedtfeld v. State, 114 Idaho 273, 275, 755 P.2d 1311, 1313

(Ct. App. 1988)).
The state filed an Answer to Parsons' Post-Conviction Petition and moved
for summary dismissal. (R., pp. 430-432, 436-439.) The state stipulated to an
extension of the deadline for Parsons to respond to the state's Motion for
Summary Dismissal. (R., pp. 445-450.) Parsons eventually filed an Objection
and Response to the state's Motion for Summary Dismissal. (R., pp. 451-467.)
The district court heard argument on the state's motion to dismiss. (R., p.
47 4.) During oral argument, Parsons struck his objections to the state's motion
to dismiss the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. (4/23/14 Tr., p. 11, L. 7 p. 13, L. 22.)

On May 1, 2014 the district court filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss and
gave Parsons 20 days to respond. (R., pp. 475-502.) On May 22, 2014 Parsons
filed an objection and requested the court gave him additional time. (R., pp. 503504.)

The district court waited until July 1, 2014 then entered the Order

Dismissing Petition. (R., pp. 505-531.) Parsons timely appealed. (R., p. 534537.)
On appeal, this Court granted Parsons' appellate counsel's motion to
withdraw.

(See 11/21/14 Motion to Withdraw and 12/12/14 Order Granting

Motion to Withdraw.) Parsons is proceeding prose. (Id.)

4

ISSUES
Parsons states the issues on appeal as:
1. A jury instruction of the necessity defense;
2. Ineffective assistance from the failure to investigate;
3. Ineffective assistance from the conflict of interest;
4. Ineffective assistance from the failure to communicate;
5. Judicial bias;
6. Co-defendant's unsworn testimonial and conviction were used
against appellant;
7. The jury instructions were defective because:
a. it is not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting the
crime;
b. jury instruction should have been provided in response to
the jury's question of, (when a robbery begins or ends);
c. jury instruction number 15 required the jury to consider
hearsay evidence;
8. Police questioned the Appellant after he invoked his right to an
attorney;
9. Trial counsel completely failed to adversarially [sic] test the
state's case;
10. Prosecutorial misconduct at 404(b) hearing;
11. Prosecutorial misconduct referring to facts that were never
proven;
12. Prosecutorial misconduct by using inflammatory and irrelevant
statements;
13. Appellant was denied his right to compulsory process;
14. Appellant's counsel for direct appeal was ineffective;
15. Evidence of Appellant's innocence should have been
investigated and presented;
16. The jury instructions No. 3 and No. 15 were a result of
ineffective assistance of counsel;
17. Crawford and hearsay issues related to Mrs. Felicia Parsons
statement and plea;
18. Violation of the right to confrontation clause;
19. Miranda violation;
20. Failure to investigate mitigation evidence;
21. Failure to file motion to suppress evidence about identification
of Appellant;
22. Failure to investigate the necessity defense and present
evidence and witnesses.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 5-6.)

5

The state rephrases the issues as:
Has Parsons failed to show the district court erred when it summarily
dismissed his post-conviction petition?
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ARGUMENT
Parsons Failed To Show The District Court's Summary Dismissal Of His Petition
For Post-Conviction Relief Was Erroneous
A.

Introduction
Parsons' arguments on appeal are generally divided up into six categories

of claims: 1) His trial counsel was ineffective (Appellant's brief, pp, 6(h)-(n), (r),
(u)-(w), (x)); 2) The state committed prosecutorial misconduct during the 404(b)
hearing and during opening statements at trial (Appellant's brief, pp. 6(p)-(q), (r));
3) His right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendmen.t was violated because
his wife did not testify at his trial (Appellant's brief, pp. 6(s)-(t)); 4) Law
enforcement continued to question him after he invoked his right to an attorney
thus violating his rights pursuant to Miranda (Appellant's brief, p. 6(w)); 5) His
appellate counsel was ineffective because he declined to make all of the
appellate arguments that Parson wanted him to make (Appellants brief, p. 6(x),
(y)); 6) The district judge was biased against him and should have been
disqualified (Appellant's brief, pp. 6(bb)-(ee)).
The district court addressed and summarily dismissed Parsons' postconviction claims. (R., pp. 505-530.)

On appeal, Parsons failed to show the

district court erred. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 1-8.)

B.

Standard Of Review
"Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil

proceedings in which, like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho
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567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834,
838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); I.C.R. 57(c)).

Idaho Code § 19-4906

authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief, in
response to a party's motion or on the court's own initiative, if the applicant "has
not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element
of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." Berg v. State,
131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).

Bare assertions and

speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make out a prima facie case
for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 649, 873
P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 1994). The court is not required to accept either the
applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or
the applicant's conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d
110, 112 (2001); Roman, 125 Idaho at 647,873 P.2d at 901. Also, because the
trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in the event of an evidentiary
hearing, summary disposition is permissible, despite the possibility of conflicting
inferences to be drawn from the facts, for the court alone will be responsible for
resolving the conflict between those inferences.
437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008).

State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho

That is, the judge in a post-conviction

action is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the
motion for summary disposition but rather is free to arrive at the most probable
inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts.

~

"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
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fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

C.

Exhibits Attached To Parsons Brief Should Be Disregarded
Attached to his Appellant's Brief, Parsons submitted Exhibits A through

GGG. It is well settled that appellate court review is limited to the evidence that
was presented in the trial court, and any attempt to introduce new evidence on
appeal by attaching documentation to an appellate brief is improper and will be
disregarded. See State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 612 n.1, 329 P.3d 391,
395, n. 1 (Ct. App. 2014); Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170 P.3d 375,
379 (2007). The exhibits attached to Parsons' Appellate Brief should therefore
be disregarded. 1

D.

Parsons Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Summarily
Dismissed His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims
On appeal Parsons argues that his trial counsel was ineffective.

(Appellant's brief, pp, 6(h)-(n), (r), (u)-(w), (x).)

The district court summarily

dismissed Parsons' ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. (R., pp. 513528.) On appeal, Parsons failed to show the district court erred.
In order to survive summary dismissal of a claim alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel, the petitioner "must establish that: (1) a material issue of
fact exists as to whether counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material

1

Some of the attached exhibits are duplicates of documents in the record and
the state will only rely upon those exhibits properly contained in the record.
9

issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced the claimant's case."
Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 624, 226 P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U .S. 668, 687-88 (1984)).

An attorney's

performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson
v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116
Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).

Tactical or strategic

decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those
decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho
231, 233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994).

To establish prejudice, a

defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Aragon
v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowgerv. State, 132
Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).

1.

Parsons Failed To Show His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Not
Requesting A Necessity Instruction

Parsons argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a
necessity instruction.

(Appellant's brief, p. 6(h) (citing ICJI 1512).)

Parsons

argues that his wife threatened and coerced him into helping her in committing
the robberies. (Id.)
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While a defendant is entitled to have his or her legal theory of the case
submitted to the jury under proper instructions, the trial court may refuse to give
t~e instruction where it is not supported by a reasonable view of the evidence.
State v. Young, 157 Idaho 280, _ , 335 P.3d 620, 625-626 (Ct. App. 2014)
(holding that defendant was not entitled to necessity instruction). The question
of whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports an
instruction to the jury on the defense of necessity is a matter of discretion for the
district court. See State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874, 878, 920 P.2d 391, 395
(1996).
The district court rejected Parsons' claim that his attorney should have
requested a necessity instruction. (R., p. 520.) The district court held there was
no reasonable view of the evidence that would have supported a necessity
defense instruction and therefore Parsons' trial counsel was not deficient for not
requesting such an instruction.

kl

Given the state of the record, there is no reasonable view of the
evidence that would have supported an instruction to the jury on
the defense of necessity. State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 87 4, 879, 920
P .2d 391, 396 (1996). Therefore, Parsons' trial counsel's decision,
did not fall below an objective standard of representation. To the
extent Parsons now relies on the so-called affidavits from his wife
that Parsons unmistakably prepared for her, trial counsel's
decisions are measured as of the date counsel made them and not
on newly generated evidence. Thus, this claim does not support
post-conviction relief.
Id. On appeal, Parsons also does not point to any evidence presented at trial
that would have supported a necessity defense. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 6(h)(k).)

Instead, he relies on the "so-called affidavits" that did not exist at the time

trial. (Id.) These affidavits were not introduced at trial and Parsons' wife did not
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testify at his trial. (R., pp. 518-519.) Parsons failed to show his trial counsel was
ineffective for declining to request a necessity instruction.

Parsons failed to

show the district court erred.

2.

Parsons Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It
Dismissed His Claim That His Trial Counsel Failed To Investigate
And Present Evidence Of His Innocence

Parsons argues that his trial counsel failed to investigate and present
evidence of his innocence, namely by declining to call his wife to testify at his
trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6(h)-6(k).) Parsons argues that his wife forced him to
participate in the robberies and his counsel failed to investigate and present this
information at trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6(h)-6(k).) The district court disagreed
and found that Parsons' trial counsel did investigate his wife's potential testimony
and made the reasoned tactical decision not to call her. (R., pp. 517-522.)
While Parsons complains that his wife could have exonerated him
and that his counsel should have presented a necessity defense,
the evidence he attached to his Petition clearly proves that his trial
counsel's decision to not call her and present a necessity defense
was a well-reasoned strategic decision. He also complains about
the decision to stipulate to his wife's guilty plea in Instruction No.3.
In his letter to Parsons dated April 28, 2011, Parsons' trial counsel
wrote in relevant part, as follows:
In addition to conversations I had with the State's attorneys,
I spoke for approximately 30 minutes with Mr. Ellsworth,
Felicia's attorney. Felicia will not be called in the State's
case in chief. She will only be called by the State as a
rebuttal witness if YOU choose to testify, and then only with
respect to what transpired after police attempted to initiate a
stop. She will testify that she did not threaten you, did not
point the gun at you, and that you drove the vehicle
voluntarily.
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Felicia does not want to testify against you. HOWEVER, it is
very clear to me that if WE call her to testify, we will not only
open the door to any questions the State may wish to ask,
but also, Felicia will testify that she was in costume when
you drove to the bank. Because that testimony, coupled with
your driving away at very high rates of speed will establish
the elements of Aiding and Abetting Robbery, it is my
intention NOT to call Felicia as a witness.
Parsons' Petition, Ex. Y (emphasis in the original). This decision to
not call his wife as a witness was clearly a strategic decision and
not the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law, or
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. This claim fails.
(R., p. 518.) Therefore, contrary to Parsons' unsupported allegations, his trial
counsel did investigate what Parsons' wife would say if she were called to testify.
(See R., pp. 249-253.)

She would have testified that she did not threaten

Parsons. (Id.) Parsons' wife "admits that she did not threaten Mr. Parsons nor
point the gun at him. She stated that his decision to drive was voluntary." (R.,
pp. 249-250.) Parsons' wife "has been consistent that she did not threaten Mr.
Parsons nor point the gun at him." (R., pp. 251-252.)
On appeal, Parsons again does not challenge any of this evidence.
Instead he again relies on affidavits created after the trial.

Moreover his trial

counsel's decisions are measured as of the date the counsel made the decisions
and not the evidence Parsons created after the trial. (See R., p. 519.) Parsons'
trial counsel was not ineffective and Parsons again failed to show the district
court erred when it summary dismissed this claim.
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3.

Parsons' Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Failing To Prevent
The Jury From Being Given Instructions Nos. 3 and 15

Parsons argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because the jury was
read Instructions Nos. 3 and 15. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6(k)-(m).) The district
court rejected both arguments. (R., pp. 524-528.)
Instruction No. 3 read, "The parties have stipulated that Felicia Elizabeth
Parsons pied guilty to the Robbery on October 20, 2010, at the Broadway
Branch of Key Bank." (R., p. 221.) Parsons argued his trial counsel erred in
stipulating and permitting this jury instruction because it denied him the
opportunity to call his wife as a witness and cross-examine her.

(Appellant's

brief, pp. 6(m)-(n).) The district court rejected this argument. (R., pp. 526-528.)
On appeal, Parsons does not challenge the district court's reasoning or
evidence. Instead he states, in conculsory fashion, that there was "no strategic
benefic to such a stipulation of unfairly prejudicial evidence" and he would like to
have cross examined her on her guilty plea and how it was negotiated.
(Appellant's brief, p. 6(n).)
Parsons failed to show the district court erred.

Parsons' trial counsel

made the reasoned strategic decision not to call Parsons' wife, because if she
had testified it "would have completely undermined any attempt to claim he was
forced to participate." (R., p. 527; see also R., pp. 249-252.) The stipulation,
which obviated the need to call Parsons' wife, was a "well-reasoned strategic
I

decision." (R., p. 528.)
Parsons also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for permitting
Instruction No. 15 to be read to the jury and for the response to the jury's
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question regarding Instruction No. 15.

(Appellant's brief, pp.

6(n)-(p).)

Instruction No. 15 reads:
The law makes no distinction between a person who directly
participates in the acts constituting a crime and a person who,
either before or during its commission, intentionally aids, assists,
facilitates, promotes, encourages, counsels, solicits, invites, helps
or hires another to commit a crime with intent to promote or assist
in its commission. Both can be found guilty of the crime. Mere
presence at, acquiescence in, or silent consent to, the planning or
commission of a crime is not sufficient to make one an accomplice.
All persons who participate in a crime either before or during its
commission, by intentionally aiding, abetting, advising, hiring,
counseling, or procuring another to commit the crime with intent to
promote or assist in its commission are guilty of the crime. All such
participants are considered principals in the commission of the
crime. The participation of each defendant in the crime must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt
(R., p. 222.)

The jurors asked the district court to clarify "when does the

commission of the robbery end, when does the commission of a robbery begin."
(R., p. 525.) The district court, with approval of both counsel, instructed the jury

to re-read the instructions. (Id.)
On appeal, Parsons argues that his trial counsel erred by not making the
court respond that a robbery only occurs during the time when the robber is
taking the property of another. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6(n)-(p).) Parsons argues
that if the jury had been so instructed he would have been acquitted because his
assistance occurred after the robbery.
argument, and pointed

(Id.)

The district court rejected his

to the abundance of evidence that supported the jury

verdict that Parsons aided and abetted his wife before the robbery. (R., pp. 525526.)
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In this case, the evidence presented to the jury included the fact
that over a period of days Parsons drove his wife dressed in
different costumes, including different colored wigs, different sun
glasses, long gloves, and carrying a loaded gun, to two different
banks. He remained in the van while she entered the bank and
then ran back to the van carrying a large plastic bag. He had rented
a van when he came to Boise in his own car. He drove that van to
one of the banks and then returned it. He and his wife checked in
and out of the same hotel. There was virtually no evidence to
suggest he was doing anything other than aiding and abetting his
wife; any suggestion he did not know what she was up to is
inconceivable.
(R., p. 526; see also R., pp. 249-252.) On appeal, Parsons does not challenge
the district court's findings or analysis that there was abundant evidence that he
assisted his wife before the commission of the robbery. (See Appellant's brief,
pp. 6(n)-(p).) Instead he rehashes the same argument presented below that he
only assisted his wife after the robbery was complete. (Id.)
Nor does Parsons explain what his trial counsel could have done
differently. Whether to give a further instructions to a jury in response to a jury
question is discretionary. (See R., p. 526 (citing State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75,
79, 175 P.3d 764, 768 (2007); State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 282, 77 P.3d
956, 971 (2003).)

Since it was within the district court's discretion how to

respond to the jury question, it is not clear how the district court's response to a
jury question somehow makes trial counsel's performance ineffective. Parsons
does not address this point on appeal. The district court did not err and Parsons'
claims that his trial counsel was ineffective regarding jury instructions were
properly dismissed.

16

4.

Parsons' Argument That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For
Declining To Object To The Prosecutor's Statements During
Opening Argument Is Not Supported By Law Or Authority

Parsons argues that his trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's
statements that Parsons' actions endangered the public and failing to object to
the prosecutor's description of a "crime scene" and statements that Parsons
endangered the public. (Appellant's brief, p. 6(r).) Parsons offers no proposition
of law or authority for this argument. (See id.) "When issues on appeal are not
supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be
considered." State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). In
addition, this argument was not raised below. (See, R., pp. 177-206, 509-511.

2

)

With the exception of jurisdictional issues, an argument not raised below and not
supported in the briefs is waived on appeal. See Zylstra v. State, 157 Idaho 457,
_ , 337 P.3d 616, 620 (2014) (citations omitted). This Court should decline to
consider this argument on appeal.

5.

Parsons' Argument That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Not
Filing A Motion In Limine Is Not Supported By Law Or Authority

Parsons argues that his counsel "was ineffective for failing to file a motion
in limine 1, regarding the identification of the Appellant." (Appellant's brief, p.
6(u) (underline in original).) However, other than a citation regarding whether a
"motion to suppress" is the same thing as a "motion in limine" there was no
authority or law offered in support of this argument. Parsons does not explain
why a motion in limine should have been filed by his trial counsel, nor does he
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offer any authority or argument to show that such a motion would have been
granted. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 6(u)-(w).) Parsons' claim fails.
In addition, because he failed to offer any authority or law in support, this
Court should decline to consider this argument on appeal.

See Zichko, 129

Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970.
6.

Parsons Did Not Support His Claim That His Trial Counsel Failed
To Investigate The Existence Of Mitigation Evidence

Parsons argues that his trial counsel failed to investigate mitigation
evidence. (Appellant's brief, p. 6(x).) The district court found that this claim was
a "bare claim" made with "mere conclusory allegations." (R., p. 522.) On appeal,
Parsons simply reiterates the conclusory allegations and does not explain what
his trial counsel failed to discover, or how his counsel's failure to find mitigation
evidence was somehow ineffective. (See Appellant's brief, p. 6(x); R., p. 212.)
Nor does he provide evidence how he was prejudiced. (Id.) The district court
did not err in dismissing this claim.

7.

The District Court Did Not Err In Dismissing Parsons' Claim That
His Trial Counsel Was Per Se Ineffective

Parsons' argues that his trial counsel failed to defend him and the trial
was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, p. 6(x) (citing
U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).) On appeal, Parsons does not provide any
facts or arguments to support this claim.

(See id.)

Instead Parsons simply

incorporates the arguments he made to the district court. (Id. (citing R., pp. 207-

2

Parsons' independent Prosecutorial Misconduct claims were raised before the
district court and are addressed in section l(E).

18

210).) The district court rejected this argument and held that the record clearly
disproves his Cronic claims. (R., pp. 514-515.) The district court found:
Instead, Parsons claims his trial counsel completely failed to
subject the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing and
labored under a conflict of interest, making Cronic applicable. The
record clearly disproves this. Therefore, the Court finds that Cronic
does not apply to any of his claims.
(R., p. 515.) On appeal, Parsons does not challenge any of the district court's

findings or reasoning. Instead, he simply relies on the argument he made below.
((Appellant's brief, p. 6(x).) Accordingly, Parsons failed to show the district court
erred. The district court properly dismissed this claim.

E.

Parsons' Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims Were Waived And Are Barred
Because They Could Have Been Raised On Direct Appeal
Parsons argues on appeal that the prosecuting attorney committed

misconduct during the 404(b) hearing because she told the court that the state's
witness had told dispatch "that the license plate, and the exact number are what
the witness gave to the dispatch in identifying the vehicle. (Appellant's brief, p.
6(p) (citing Ex. H, Tr., p. 28, L. 25 - p. 28, I. 3. 3) According to Parsons this was a
misleading statement.

(Id.)

Parsons also argues the state committed

prosecutorial misconduct during opening statement because the prosecutor
gave her interpretation of the facts to the jury. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6(p)-(q).)

Parsons referenced this 404(b) transcript in his Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief and filed a request for the 404(b) transcript. (See, R., pp. 223, 400.) It is
unclear why the transcript of this 404(b) hearing was not included in the record
below.
3
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Parsons also claims it was also misconduct for the prosecutor to mention facts in
her opening that were not established at trial. (Appellant's brief, p. 6(r).)
The district court dismissed Parsons' claims of prosecutorial misconduct
because those were claims that could have been addressed on direct appeal.
(R., p. 528 (citing Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 605, 606, 21 P. 3d 924, 928
(2001 ).)

The district court further found that Parsons did not present any

allegations or evidence supporting an independent claim of prosecutorial
misconduct. (R., p. 528 (citing Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 475, 224 P. 3d
536, 542 (Ct. App. 2009).) On appeal, Parsons does not provide any argument
or authority to show the district court erred. (See, (Appellant's brief, pp. 6(p)-(q),
(r).)

Nor does he cite to evidence supporting an independent claim of

prosecutorial misconduct.
Further, Parsons waived the prosecutorial misconduct claims below.
During oral argument on the state's motion to dismiss, Parsons withdrew his
objections to the state's motion to dismiss the prosecutorial misconduct claims.
(4/23/14 Tr., p. 11, L. 7 - p. 13, L. 22; see also R., pp. 456-457.) Because the
prosecutorial misconduct claims were claims without support that could have
been raised on direct appeal and because these claims were waived below, this
Court should affirm the district court.

F.

Parsons' Confrontation Clause Claim Is A Merely Conclusory Allegation
And Cannot Be Brought For The First Time On Post-Conviction
Parsons argues his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment was

violated because evidence of his wife's confession and conviction was admitted
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at trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6(s)-(t).) In his Petition For Post-Conviction Relief,
Parsons' Confrontation Clause claim was included as part of his claim of "judicial
bias." (See R., pp. 97-110. 4 )

The district court held that "[o]ther than merely

alleging the Court was biased, Parsons identifies no evidence of that bias or how
it adversely affected the outcome of the trial." (R., p. 513.) On appeal Parsons
does not show the district court erred. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 6(s)-(t).)
Related to his Confrontation Clause claim is a claim entitled "Crawford
Violation."

(R., p. 112.)

This claim is a merely conclusory claim and is not

supported by any admissible evidence. The Court is not required to accept mere
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible or a petitioners conclusions of
law. See Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903. Further, Parsons offers no
explanation or law explaining how this "Crawford Violation" claim could not have
been brought on direct appeal. Therefore, this claim cannot now be brought for
the first on a post-conviction petition. See I.C. § 19-4901; Rodgers v. State, 129
Idaho 720, 725, 932 P.2d 348, 353 (1997).

G.

Parsons Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Dismissed His
Miranda Violation Claim
Parsons argues that law enforcement continued to question him after he

invoked his right to an attorney. (Appellant's brief, p. 6(w).) On appeal it is not
clear whether Parsons is attempting to characterize this Miranda claim as a
separate stand-alone claim or part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
(See Appellant's brief, pp. 6(u)-(x).) In front of the district court this claim was

4

See specifically pages 104-107.
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presented as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (See R., pp. 516-517.)
The district court held that Parsons did invoke his right

to

counsel, but "never

identified what statements should have been suppressed or what statements he
made that were used against him." (R., p. 516.)

The district court "carefully

reviewed the record [Parsons] attached to his Petition and [found] that even if his
attorney had filed a motion to suppress, it would have been unsuccessful. There
is no evidence that Parsons ever made any incriminating statements following
his invocation." (R., p. 517.) On appeal Parsons does not challenge the district
court's determination that he did not make any incriminating statements after he
invoked his Miranda rights. (Appellant's brief, p. 6(w).)

H.

Parsons Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Dismissed His
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel Clain:,
Parsons claimed his appellate counsel was ineffective. (R., pp. 213-215.)

The district court rejected this claim and held:
With respect to his appellate counsel Parsons complains about the
amount of contact he had and that counsel did not raise all the
issues he wanted raised on appeal. He does not identify what
should have been raised. Likewise, he does not identify what
prejudice he suffered. Contrary to Parsons' claims, appellate
counsel is not required to raise every conceivable issue. Aragon v.
State, 114 Idaho 758, 765, 760 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1988). Rather,
appellate counsel is required only to make a conscientious
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best
arguments to be made. Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280, 285, 32
P.3d 672, 677 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho
115,119,937 P.2d 427,431 (Ct. App. 1997)).
Idaho appellate courts will not second guess strategic and tactical
decisions of trial or appellate counsel whether to pursue a
particular issue or theory, unless there is "evidence that the
decision was the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the
law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." Short
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v. State, 135 Idaho 40, 13 P.3d 1253, 1255-1256 (Ct. App. 2000)
(citing Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 160, 857 P.2d 634, 639 (Ct.
App. 1993)). There is absolutely no evidence his appellate
attorney's performance was less than adequate. Therefore,
Parsons cannot establish the first prong of an ineffective counsel
claim. Furthermore, Parsons did not identify how any result would
have been different. The evidence against Parsons was solid.
This conclusory claim does not support post -conviction relief.
(R., p. 529.) On appeal, Parsons reiterates his claim that his appellate counsel
declined to raise all of the issues on appeal that Parsons wanted him to raise.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 6(x)-(y).)
In response to the district court's decision, Parsons questions how the
district court could have determined what appellate counsel's strategic and
tactical decisions were. (Appellant's brief, p. 6(y).) "How does the Court know,
what Mr. Silvey's [appellate counsel] strategic and tactical aims were without
questioning Mr. Silvey in an Evidentiary Hearing. [sic]" (Appellant's brief, p. 6(y).)
Parsons' argument on appeal fails to acknowledge that his appellate counsel
sent him detailed letters explaining why he would not be raising all the appellate
arguments that Parsons requested. (See R., pp. 264-269, 273.)
Parsons' appellate counsel provided reasoned decisions why he would
not be raising the issues Parsons' requested.

(R., p. 273.)

Parsons simply

disagrees with his appellate counsel's tactical and strategic decisions and does
not identify how his appellate counsel's performance was deficient.

Nor does

Parsons meet the second prong of the Strickland test and show how the
outcome of the appeal would have been different had his counsel raised these
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additional claims. The district court did not err in dismissing Parsons' ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claims.

I.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Parsons' Judicial Bias Claims
Because They Were With Merit
Parsons claimed that the district judge was biased against him because

she ruled against him. (R., pp. 97-111.) The district court found that there was
no evidence to support Parsons' claim of judicial bias. (R., p. 513.) The district
court held, "Other than merely alleging the Court was biased, Parsons identifies
no evidence of that bias or how it adversely affected the outcome of his trial."
(Id.)
On appeal, Parsons again claims the district judge was biased, and in
support of this claim he cites to instances when the district judge ruled against
him.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 6(bb)-(ee).)

In particular, Parsons argues that the

district court was biased because the district judge found "a large number of
Parsons'

[post-conviction]

claims

(Appellant's brief, pp. 6(dd).)

are

simply

unsupported

by evidence."

The district court's decision and reasoning was

based upon the law and the record. There is no evidence of bias, and the district
court did not err in dismissing Parsons' judicial misconduct claims.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the
district court.
DATED this 7th day of May 2015.
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